Hybrid wellbeing and the value of freedom
(2025) Economics and Philosophy — Vol. 41, n° 3, p. 465-483 (2025)
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- <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Which implications follow for the value of freedom on a hybrid account of wellbeing that appeals to endorsement? On the basis of Olsaretti’s empirical claim that one is unlikely to endorse wellbeing when one is forced to achieve it, I show that standardly on the hybrid account there is a reason to protect people’s freedom to dysfunction, and hence that the freedoms to dysfunction are valuable. I also discuss whether freedom is non-specifically valuable on grounds of endorsement. I advance an epistemic version of freedom’s non-specific value that is especially relevant for a theory of justice that appeals to publicity.</jats:p>
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Citations
Intropi, P. (2025). Hybrid wellbeing and the value of freedom. Economics and Philosophy, 41(3), 465-483. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267124000439 (Original work published 2025)