Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality
(2025) Metaphysica : Zeitschrift für Ontologie & Metaphysik — Vol. 26, n° 1, p. 1-17 (2025)
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- In this paper, I shall discuss the question whether a concrete object can be multi-located while it is moving or not. I shall say nothing on the vexed issue of multi-location in and for itself. In-deed, the debate is subtle and difficult (see Kleinschmidt 2011 and Costa & Calosi 2020): there are plenty arguments in favour or against the metaphysical possibility of multi-location, but I believe that none is decisive enough to win the race. Therefore, my discussion will support a ‘might’-conditional claim: ‘if multi-location were possi-ble, then change might imply multi-location’. In other words, I wish to offer a case-study for multi-location. To do this, after a very short clarification of the various meanings of ‘to be lo-cated’ (§1), I will first present and discuss Diodorus Cronus’ arguments against the reality of the state-of-being-in-motion, since they focus on the question of what the location of the moving item is (§2), and then scrutinize Hegel’s reply to Diodorus’ reasonings, insofar as his answer consists in claiming that an object in motion is in many locations at once (§3). Although many philosophers of the past are referred to, this paper does not aim to be a piece of scholarship, but to explore the various met-aphysical possibilities concerning the logic of location underlying change.
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Marion, F. (2025). Change and Location: A New and Old Case against Functionality. Metaphysica : Zeitschrift für Ontologie & Metaphysik, 26(1), 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2024-0011 (Original work published 2025)