Oligopolistic competition with general complementarities

Calciano, Filippo Luca
(2011)

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  • Calciano, Filippo LucaUCLouvain
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Abstract
In this paper we extend the basic model of Cournot competition to the case where both the demand function and the cost functions of each firm depend on the amounts produced by competitors. In this modified setting, proving existence of equilibria becomes harder. We develop a generalization of the theory of supermodular games in the context where individual decision variables take values in a totally ordered set to prove existence of equilibria in this generalized Cournot setting.
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Calciano, F. L. (2011). Oligopolistic competition with general complementarities (CORE Discussion Paper 2011/54). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/209859