Information advantage and dominant strategies in second-price auctions
(2000)
Files
dp2000-55.pdf
Open Access - Adobe PDF
- 119.61 KB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an information advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses a dominant strategy. A dominant strategy is, in fact, unique, and is given by the conditional expectation of the common value with respect to his information field. Furthermore, when a bidder has information advantage, other bidders cannot make a profit.
- Affiliations
Citations
Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., & Sela, A. (2000). Information advantage and dominant strategies in second-price auctions (CORE Discussion Papers 2000/55). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/42795