A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

Albano, Gian-Luigi;Germano, Fabrizio;Lovo, Stefano
(1999)

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  • Albano, Gian-Luigi
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  • Germano, Fabrizio
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  • Lovo, Stefano
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Abstract
In an example with two objects and four bidders, some of which have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auctions.
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Albano, G.-L., Germano, F., & Lovo, S. (1999). A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies (CORE Discussion Papers 1999/52). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/128154