Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria
(2013)
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- Abstract
- We investigate whether the plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in large elections with multiple alternatives, in which voters have common interests. Voters’ preferences depend on an unknown state of nature, and they receive imprecise private signals about the state of nature prior to the election. Similar to two-alternative elections (e.g., Myer- son (1998)), there always exists an informationally efficient equilibrium in which the correct alternative is elected. However, we identify new types of coordination failures in elections with more than two alternatives that lead to new types of inefficient equilibria. These can have interesting new properties: Voters may vote informatively, but the correct alternative is not elected.
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Citations
Goertz, J., & Maniquet, F. (2013). Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria (CORE Discussion Paper 2013/23). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/204723