Melese d'Hospital, FrançoisUniversity of British Columbia and UCLouvain
Author
Abstract
(en) A frequently stated objective of non-cartel countries is to reduce their dependence on foreign supplies of a strategic exhaustible
resource.
One measure seriously discussed by government officials (and representatives of extractive industries) involves the provision (or liberalization) of depletion allowances aimed at home-country extractive firms dealing in the cartelized product. When a depletion allowance
is considered in the context of a dynamic dominant-firm model, it is found that short-run supply constraints may be lifted (and thus independence assured) only at the expense of longer-run dependence on foreign reserves. Further results warn that this policy instrument may involve significant costs and tradeoffs likely to reduce its ability to achieve the desired objective.
Melese d’Hospital, F. (1979). A Competitive Sector Depletion Allowance in the Context of an Intertemporal Dominant-Firm Model (Working Papers Institut des sciences économiques 7914). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/278802