We complete the state-of-the-art on the side-channel security of real-world devices by analysing two 32-bit microcontrollers equiped with an unprotected co-processor. Our results show that (i) the lack of understanding of their hardware architecture can be circumvented with standard detection tools { for this purpose, we combine a simple variation of the Test Vector Leakage Assessment methodology with Signal-to-Noise Ratio estimations, which enables the efficient identification of attack vectors; (ii) standard distinguishers then lead to powerful key recoveries with less than 5,000 traces; and (iii) preprocessing like the continuous wavelet transform can be useful in such a black box evaluation context.
Udvarhelyi, B., van Wassenhove, A., Bronchain, O., & Standaert, F.-X. (2020). On the Security of Off-the-Shelf Microcontrollers: Hardware is not Enough. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 12609, 103-118. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/256615 (Original work published 2020)