Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies
(2001)
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- Abstract
- We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by the these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations. We extend to semi-strong correlated equilibria Aumann's Bayesian interpretation of correlated equilibria.
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Citations
Giraud, G., & Rochon, C. (2001). Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies (CORE Discussion Papers 2001/18). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/32827