Endogenous vertical segmentation in a Cournot oligopoly

Belleflamme, Paul;Forlin, Valeria
(2020) Journal of Economics — Vol. 131, p. 181-195 (2020)

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Abstract
An arbitrary number of (ex ante symmetric) firms first choose whether to produce a high-quality or a low-quality product and then, the quantity of product to put on the market. We establish the following results: (i) there exists competition within and across quality segments; (ii)firms ma be better off producing the low quality if competition within this segment is sufficiently low; (iii) a firm's switch across qualities may benefit all the other firms; (iv) there exists a unique partition of the firms between the two quality segments; (v) if high quality has a larger cost-quality ratio, then the equilibrium exhibits vertical differentiation; (vi) there may be too much differentiation from the consumers' point of view.
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Belleflamme, P., & Forlin, V. (2020). Endogenous vertical segmentation in a Cournot oligopoly. Journal of Economics, 131, 181-195. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00706-8 (Original work published 2020)