Pensions and Voting Equilibria in an Overlapping Generation Model with Heterogeneous Agents.
(1999)
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- Abstract
- We model how a Beveridgean pay-as-you-go pension system may be supported by a majority of heterogeneous voters in a general equilibrium OLG model. The introduction of heterogeneity creates intragenerational transfers among workers which may lead to different optimal taxation rates within young individuals and to a positive taxation rate as outcome of the political choice. We underline the general equilibrium effects of a PAYG pension system on the interest rate, on future wages and therefore on the future level of pensions. We obtain an equilibrium tax rate and pension level that do not depend on population growth rate and on the capital stock.
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Citations
Mahieu, G., & Rottier, S. (1999). Pensions and Voting Equilibria in an Overlapping Generation Model with Heterogeneous Agents. (ECON Working Papers 1999/31). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/130054