Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies

Bloch, Francis;Ferrer, Hélène
(1999)

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  • Bloch, Francis
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  • Ferrer, Hélène
    Author
Abstract
This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all equilibria are equivalent to an equilibrium where all agents trade on a single market.
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Bloch, F., & Ferrer, H. (1999). Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies (CORE Discussion Papers 1999/08). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/39603