Domestic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons
(2016) Resource and Energy Economics — Vol. 44, p. 183-205 (2016)
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- Abstract
- The paper analyzes the strategic behavior of several countriesengaged in capital accumulation, pollution mitigation, and envi-ronmental adaptation in the context of an environmental commongood. Both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies are dis-cussed. The non-cooperative strategy is a dynamic game in whicheach country makes its own environmental decision following theopen-loop Nash equilibrium. The cooperative social planner prob-lem assumes an international environmental agreement in force.The non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are compared inthe symmetric case of two countries and extended to several iden-tical countries. It is shown that the non-cooperative strategy inmulti-country world leads to over-production, over-consumption,over-pollution, and over-adaptation.
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Bréchet, T., Hritonenko, N., & Yatsenko, Y. (2016). Domestic environmental policy and international cooperation for global commons. Resource and Energy Economics, 44, 183-205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.03.002 (Original work published 2016)