The question of free will has been one of the major puzzles in philosophy for centuries. The usual issues include its compatibility with the deterministic nature of the universe and the existence of alternative possibilities. This dissertation goes beyond those popular issues, and focuses on what I argue is a ubiquitous, implicit assumption, which can be found in of most of the approaches to free will both in philosophy and in neuroscience, namely the causal efficacy of the mental. I show that, without the mental having an impact on the physical realm, free will is impossible. However, while being a necessary condition, causal efficacy of the mental should not be at the same time considered a sufficient condition. Given the importance of the notion, I analyze a number of concepts of causation, and show the various ways in which something could be a cause, and the types of connections that allow us to identify a link as causal. I then move to the main issue related to both free will and causation: the Causal Exclusion problem. I discuss a variety of solutions that were proposed in recent years, I apply them to the free will problem and show why all of them fall short. Then, I propose my own solution to the exclusion issue, which allows for an explanation of how the mental could be causal, and secures the possibility of free will.
Drozdzewska, A. (2018). The gordian knot of free will : why causally efficacious mental is a necessary condition for free action. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/38325