Meroni Doctrine and the Delegation of Powers to EU Agencies
(2026) EU Banking Union: Law, Institutions, and Co-operation — ISBN: [9780198949749], 167-190, published
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- Abstract
- The Banking Union led to a proliferation of EU agencies to effectively supervise and regulate financial markets. Agencies allow the pooling of expert knowledge, the outsourcing of certain tasks, and the depoliticization of complex decision-making procedures. Delegating powers to agencies raises questions of legal and political responsibility. While the Treaties do not explicitly address these questions, a series of case law collectively called the Meroni doctrine deals with the interrelated questions of what powers can be delegated and how autonomously agencies may act. This contribution gives an overview of the Meroni case law and analyses how it influenced the delegation of powers within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the delegation of autonomous powers to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and the decision-making in the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). This allows us to unveil the many faces of Meroni and how this doctrine has a far-reaching impact on the Banking Union.
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Bauerschmidt, J. (2026). Meroni Doctrine and the Delegation of Powers to EU Agencies. In Jonathan Bauerschmidt, Raffaele D’Ambrosio, Diane Fromage, Daniela Jaros, Paul Weismann (ed.), EU Banking Union: Law, Institutions, and Co-operation (pp. 167-190). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198949756.003.0010