Proclus’ Neoplatonist Logic: Negations and The Principle of Non-Contradiction
(2024) 21st Annual ISNS (International Society for Neoplatonic Studies) Conference — Location: Trinity College Dublin, Dublin (19.June.2024)
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- Abstract
- The aim of the paper is to discuss Proclus’ accounts of negation and their relation-ships with the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC). First, I will argue that every negation distinguished by Proclus (hypernegation, formal negation and privative ne-gation) a priori entails a failure of the PNC given that none is Boolean. Then, I shall focus my presentation on hypernegation that applies to the One in order to examine Proclus’ view that the One is incomplete but consistent. More precisely, at the end of his commentary on the First Hypothesis, Proclus claims that only formulas of the form not-A & not-not-A apply to the One. I offer to suggest new formal readings for such a claim which would be useful to understand the relationship between hyperne-gation and the ‘axioms of contradiction’, that is, the PNC and the Principle of Ex-cluded-Middle.
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Marion, F. (2024). Proclus’ Neoplatonist Logic: Negations and The Principle of Non-Contradiction. 21st Annual ISNS (International Society for Neoplatonic Studies) Conference, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin.