Given the omnipresence of delegation and control in the EU, the principal–agent model has become a popular analytical framework to study the design and effects of delegation and control. Yet, with the ascendance of governance as a mode of decision-making, the contemporary relevance of the principal–agent model became contested. We argue that the model still retains its relevance to study contemporary EU politics, but it requires researchers to follow a two-step approach. First, the hierarchical, dyadic relationship under study has to be clearly defined amidst a complex web of relations. Second, the conditions that have led to the observed pattern of delegation and/or the consequences of this pattern on the distribution of power between the principals and the agent can be inquired.
Delreux, T., & Adriaensen, J. (2017). Introduction. Use and limitations of the principal-agent model in studying the European Union. In Delreux Tom & Adriaensen Johan (ed.), The Principal Agent Model and the European Union (p. p. 1-34). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_1