In this article, I critically evaluate Cory Doctorow’s “enshittification” thesis, which posits that digital platforms inevitably decline in quality as they mature, increasingly extracting value from users until they ultimately collapse. Drawing on economic theory and empirical evidence, I explore the mechanisms that may drive this potential decline. My analysis supports certain aspects of the thesis but challenges others. On the one hand, it is generally acknowledged that platforms tend to favor different user groups at various stages of their evolution, and that dominant positions often emerge, which can lead to strategic abuses of market power. On the other hand, being dominant does not necessarily doom a platform to failure, as many continue to thrive despite allegations of value extraction. Furthermore, platform decay can stem not only from excessive dominance but also from intense competition among rival platforms. Finally, I examine how competition policy and regulation can mitigate platform decay without undermining platforms’ capacity to create value by solving market failures.
Belleflamme, P. (2025). Are digital platforms bound to decay? An economic examination of the “enshittification” thesis. C P I Antitrust Chronicle, October. (Original work published 2025)