(en) Following Jefferson’s suggestion, I take seriously the promises of a comparison between nations and generations, as part of a philosophical theory of justice and of democracy concerned with our obligations towards members of other generations. I focus here on three of the features that are specific to intergenerational relations, through a comparison with correspond- ing international situations. The first feature has to do with people’s temporal immobility beyond the lapse of time that extends from their birth to their death. Such immobility renders some period-specific resources inaccessible to gener- ations from other periods, which may have implications for some theories of justice. The second feature that I look into is the period-locked nature of the members each generation. The intergenerational transfer of goods to future generations then depends on the passive as well as active collaboration of tran- sit generations. I show why and to what extent this matters to the definition of our intergenerational obligations. Finally, I insist on the one-directional feature of time’s passage — through an analogy with the situation of riparian nations along a river — and on its effect on the temporal distribution of costs and bene- fits, as well as of vulnerabilities. I explore the potential normative implications of such one-directionality for the definition of a fair distribution of power between generations. Through looking at these three features and closely exam- ining their implications, I also hope to stress the relevance of an anatomico- analogical method for the understanding of what we owe other generations, and especially future ones.
Gosseries, A. (2015). Les générations, le fleuve et l’océan. Philosophiques : revue de la Société de Philosophie du Québec, 42(1), 153-176. https://doi.org/10.7202/1032222ar (Original work published 2015)