Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?
(2018) Review of Philosophy and Psychology — Vol. 10, n° 4, p. 649-667 (2018)
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- Authors
Kammerer, François 
- Abstract
- Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the alleged “explanatory gap” between phenomenal states and physical states as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion. In this paper, I argue that the explanatory gap does not rest on a fallacy or a cognitive illusion. This does not imply the falsity of physicalism, but it has consequences on the kind of physicalism we should embrace.
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Citations
Kammerer, F. (2018). Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(4), 649-667. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0424-1 (Original work published 2018)