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We design new encryption mechanisms that enable the design of the first universally verifiable voting schemes, supporting both receipt-freeness and everlasting privacy without assuming the existence of an anonymous channel. Our schemes support the two most traditional election tallying methods: One is additively homomorphic, supporting elections in which votes simply need to be added, but decryption is only efficient for a message space of polylogarithmic size. The other is randomizable, is compatible with traditional mixnet-based tallying methods, and supports efficient message encoding, which makes it compatible with virtually any election type. Our approach builds on the recently proposed traceable receipt-free encryption (TREnc) primitive to support the design of a perfectly private audit trail. In particular, we propose two TREnc that are secure under SXDH and rely on a public coin CRS (or on the random oracle model). This improves on previous TREnc mechanisms that required a structured CRS and is of independent interest. A prototype implementation of our mechanisms is proposed, which shows that ballot preparation and verification can be executed in less than a second.
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Doan, T. V. T., Pereira, O., & Peters, T. (2024). Encryption Mechanisms for Receipt-Free and Perfectly Private Verifiable Elections. Applied Cryptography and Network Security 22nd International Conference, ACNS 2024, 2024, Proceedings, Part II. Published. 22nd International Conference, ACNS 2024, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/216618 (Original work published 2024)