State Religious Neutrality as a Common European Standard? Reappraising the European Court of Human Rights Approach
(2017) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion — Vol. 6, n° 1, p. 1-24 (2017)
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- Abstract
- This article explores the development by the European Court of Human Rights of the notion that states have a duty to be neutral in religious matters. It is submitted that such a principle of neutrality, which echoes a classic tenet of liberal philosophy, can legitimately be derived from the rights and ideals enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. It can be considered a corollary of religious freedom, non-discrimination and pluralism. However, the way the Court has interpreted this concept throughout its case law gives rise to cricisim. The Court has failed to remain consistent in its approach to neutrality. In effect, it balances between three different understandings of the concept. They are characterized here as 'neutrality as absence of coercion', 'neutrality as absence of preference', and 'neutrality as exclusion of religion from the public sphere'. The present article argues that 'neutrality as absence of preference' provides the most adequate model for an ECHR-based concept of state religious neutrality.
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Ringelheim, J. (2017). State Religious Neutrality as a Common European Standard? Reappraising the European Court of Human Rights Approach. Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 6(1), 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1093/OJLR/rww060 (Original work published 2017)