Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager: physician interaction
(2011) The European Journal of Health Economics — Vol. 12, n° 5, p. 417-427 (2011)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- This paper examines the consequences of the introduction of an activity-based reimbursement system on the behavior of physicians and hospital’s managers. We consider a private for-profit sector where both hospitals and physicians are initially paid on a fee-for-service basis. We show that the benefit of the introduction of an activity-based system depends on the type of interaction between managers and physicians (simultaneous or sequential decision-making games). It is shown that, under the activity-based system, a sequential interaction with physician leader could be beneficial for both agents in the private sector. We further model an endogenous timing game à la Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ Behav 2: 29–46, 1990) in which the type of interaction is determined endogenously. We show that, under the activity-based system, the sequential interaction with physician leader is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
- Affiliations
IESEG School of Management CNRS/LEM(UMR 8179) IESEG School of Management CNRS/LEM
Citations
Crainich, D., Leleu, H., & Mauleon, A. (2011). Hospital’s activity-based financing system and manager: physician interaction. The European Journal of Health Economics, 12(5), 417-427. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-010-0255-1 (Original work published 2011)