A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings

Isaac, Tanguy
(2011) Mathematical Social Sciences — Vol. 61, n° 3, p. 152-156 (2011)

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  • Isaac, TanguyUCLouvain
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Abstract
We reconsider the model used by Serrano and Yosha (1993) who were interested in information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We prove that there exists an additional equilibrium not detected in the original paper and show that this equilibrium is characterized by incomplete revelation of information which was not the case of the other already identified equilibria of the model.
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Isaac, T. (2011). A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings. Mathematical Social Sciences, 61(3), 152-156. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.02.004 (Original work published 2011)