Voting on pensions: sex and marriage
(2011) European Journal of Political Economy — Vol. 27, n° 2, p. 281-296 (2011)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- Existing political economy models of pensions focus on age and productivity. In this paper we incorporate two additional individual characteristics: sex and marital status. We ignore the role of age, by assuming that people vote at the start of their life, and characterize the preferred rate of taxation that finances a Beveridgean pension scheme when individuals differ in wage, sex and marital status. We allow for two types of couples: one-breadwinner and two-breadwinner couples. Marriage pools both wage and longevity differences between men and women. Hence singles tend to have more extreme preferred tax rates than couples. We show that the majority voting outcome depends on the relative number of one-breadwinner couples and on the size of derived pension rights.
- Affiliations
Université de Liège CREPP Australian National University College of Business and Economics
Citations
Leroux, M.-L., Pestieau, P., & Racionero Llorente, M. d. M. (2011). Voting on pensions: sex and marriage. European Journal of Political Economy, 27(2), 281-296. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.10.001 (Original work published 2011)