Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case

Ramaekers, Eve
(2013) Social Choice and Welfare — Vol. 41, n° 2, p. 359-380 (2013)

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  • Ramaekers, EveUCLouvain
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Abstract
One must allocate a finite set of indivisible goods among two agents without monetary compensation. We impose Pareto-efficiency, anonymity, a weak notion of no-envy, a welfare lower bound based on each agent's ranking of the subsets of goods, and a monotonicity property w.r.t. changes in preferences. We prove that there is a rule satisfying these axioms. If there are three goods, it is the only rule, together with one of its subcorrespondences, satisfying each fairness axiom and not discriminating between goods.
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Ramaekers, E. (2013). Fair allocation of indivisible goods: the two-agent case. Social Choice and Welfare, 41(2), 359-380. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0684-0 (Original work published 2013)