Market game in successive oligopolies

Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean;Laussel, Didier;Van Ypersele, Tanguy;Zanaj, Skerdilajda
(2013) Journal of Public Economic Theory — Vol. 15, n° 3, p. 397-410 (2013)

Files

GabsRep.pdf
  • Closed Access
  • Adobe PDF
  • 557.76 KB
Request a copy

Details

Authors
  • Jaskold Gabszewicz, JeanUCLouvain
    Author
  • Laussel, DidierGREQAM, Université d'Aix-Marseille
    Author
  • Van Ypersele, TanguyGREQAM, Université d'Aix-Marseille
    Author
  • Zanaj, SkerdilajdaUniversité du Luxembourg
    Author
Abstract
This paper introduces a new approach to successive oligopolies. We draw on market games à la Shapley-Shubik to examine how successive oligopolies operate between downstream and upstream markets when the input price is determined by the action of all firms, downstream and upstream both. This approach differs from the classical one as it allows us to consider downstream firms that exercise market power both in both downstream and upstream markets. We perform a comparison of the market outcome with each scenearios as well as welfare analysis.
Affiliations

Citations

  • APA
  • Chicago
  • FWB

Jaskold Gabszewicz, J., Laussel, D., Van Ypersele, T., & Zanaj, S. (2013). Market game in successive oligopolies. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 15(3), 397-410. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12023 (Original work published 2013)