Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation

Carayol, Nicolas;Delille, Rémy;Vannetelbosch, Vincent
(2015) Economics Letters — Vol. 137, p. 50-53 (2015)

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Authors
  • Carayol, NicolasGREThA, Université de Bordeaux-CNRS
    Author
  • Delille, RémyGREThA, Université de Bordeaux-CNRS
    Author
  • Vannetelbosch, VincentUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex and the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.
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Carayol, N., Delille, R., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2015). Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation. Economics Letters, 137, 50-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.020 (Original work published 2015)