Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: The hidden cost of hiding

Belleflamme, Paul;Vergote, Wouter
(2016) Economics Letters —

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Abstract
A monopolist can use a ‘tracking’ technology to identify a consumer’s willingness to pay with some probability. Consumers can counteract tracking by acquiring a ‘hiding’ technology. We show that consumers may be collectively better off absent this hiding technology.
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Belleflamme, P., & Vergote, W. (2016). Monopoly price discrimination and privacy: The hidden cost of hiding. Economics Letters. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.027