Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence
(2017) European Economic Review — Vol. 94, p. 80-102 (2017)
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- Abstract
- The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication—i.e. who is talking with whom—in a coordination game. We run an experiment in a three-player game with Pareto ranked equilibria, where a pair of players has a profitable joint deviation from the Pareto- superior equilibrium. We show that specific communication structures lead to different 'coalition-proof' equilibria in this game. Results match the theoretical predictions. Subjects communicate and play the Pareto-superior equilibrium when communication is public. When pairs of players exchange messages privately, subjects play the Pareto-inferior equilibrium. Even in these latter cases, however, players’ beliefs and choices tend to react to messages, despite the fact that these are not credible.
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Grandjean, G., Mantovani, M., Mauleon, A., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2017). Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence. European Economic Review, 94, 80-102. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.02.007 (Original work published 2017)