Early Forms of Metaethical Constructivism in John Dewey's Pragmatism
(2016) Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy — Vol. 4, n° 9, p. 1-13 (2016)
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- This paper demonstrates the innovative character of the approach to metaethics underlying John Dewey’s pragmatism. Dewey's theory of evaluation is contrasted with one of the most dominant contemporary metaethical theses: constructivism. I show that the insistence placed by metaethical constructivists on the actor’s practical point of view, on the rejection of the subjective preferences model, and on a specific form of ethical antirealism and naturalism echoes some of the most crucial claims made by Dewey. This argumentation leads to my main hypothesis: an analysis of Dewey's conception of evaluation allows us to highlight the groundbreaking character of its metaethical approach—an approach that will be characterized as fairly constructivist.
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Dostie Proulx, P.-L. (2016). Early Forms of Metaethical Constructivism in John Dewey’s Pragmatism. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 4(9), 1-13. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/180492 (Original work published 2016)