Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design
(2019) Social Design: Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz — ISBN: [9783319938080], p. 85-98, published
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- (en) Although the problem of revelation of preferences for public goods had already been brought up in several instances, it was surely the merit of Leo Hurwicz to show that providing incentives was a fundamental problem in the design of any institution for collective decision based on decentralized information and control.
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d’Aspremont-Lynden, C., & Crémer, J. (2019). Some remarks on Bayesian mechanism design. In Walter Trockel (ed.), Social Design: Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz (p. p. 85-98). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_6