Selecting Constitutional Judges Randomly

Vandamme, Pierre-Etienne;Bello Hutt, Donald
(2020) Swiss Political Science Review — Vol. 27, n° 1, p. 107-127 (2021)

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Abstract
This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposalfor the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining thevalues of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process –selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates – with a random selection among this pool. Weargue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specificlegitimacy of courts, and we champion this two-stage mechanism vis-a-vis other, more traditionallyemployed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal andconclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations.
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Vandamme, P.-E., & Bello Hutt, D. (2020). Selecting Constitutional Judges Randomly. Swiss Political Science Review, 27(1), 107-127. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12416 (Original work published 2021)