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TCHES2022_4_06.pdf
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Abstract
This paper introduces and analyzes Triplex, a leakage-resistant mode of operation based on Tweakable Block Ciphers (TBCs) with 2n-bit tweaks. Triplex enjoys beyond-birthday ciphertext integrity in the presence of encryption and decryption leakage in a liberal model where all intermediate computations are leaked in full and only two TBC calls operating a long-term secret are protected with implementationlevel countermeasures. It provides beyond-birthday confidentiality guarantees without leakage, and standard confidentiality guarantees with leakage for a single-pass mode embedding a re-keying process for the bulk of its computations (i.e., birthday confidentiality with encryption leakage under a bounded leakage assumption). Triplex improves leakage-resistant modes of operation relying on TBCs with n-bit tweaks when instantiated with large-tweak TBCs like Deoxys-TBC (a CAESAR competition laureate) or Skinny (used by the Romulus finalist of the NIST lightweight crypto competition). Its security guarantees are maintained in the multi-user setting.
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Citations

Shen, Y., Peters, T., Standaert, F.-X., Cassiers, G., & Verhamme, C. (2022). Triplex: an Efficient and One-Pass Leakage-Resistant Mode of Operation. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2022(4), 135-162. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2022.i4.135-162 (Original work published 2022)