"Nice" trivial equilibria in strategic market games

Cordella, T.;Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean
(1998) Games and Economic Behavior — Vol. 22, n° 1, p. 162-169 (1998)

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  • Cordella, T.
    Author
  • Jaskold Gabszewicz, JeanUCLouvain
    Author
Abstract
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all of the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik (1978), for which the trivial Nash equilibrium is the unique equilibrium point of the associated market game. From this example, we are led to propose an argument, related to the intensity of competition, explaining whv there could be no trade at an equilibrium point. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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Cordella, T., & Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. (1998). “Nice” trivial equilibria in strategic market games. Games and Economic Behavior, 22(1), 162-169. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0569 (Original work published 1998)