Price Equilibria in Pure Strategies for Homogeneous Oligopoly
Allen, Beth;Thisse, Jacques-François
(1992) Journal of Economics & Management Strategy — Vol. 1, n° 1, p. 63-81 (1992)
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Allen, Beth
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Thisse, Jacques-FrançoisUCLouvain
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Abstract
For a homogeneous product oligopoly market, possibilities for pure strategy Nash equilibria in prices are studied. Consumers, who each nonstrategically purchase one unit up to a common reservation price, are hypothesized to be more concerned with large price differences (and therefore buy from the cheapest firm) than slightly different prices. For the duopoly case, existence, uniqueness, and characterization results are provided. Linear examples are given with 2 and n firms.
Allen, B., & Thisse, J.-F. (1992). Price Equilibria in Pure Strategies for Homogeneous Oligopoly. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1(1), 63-81. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00063.x (Original work published 1992)