Concurrence en prix et équilibres cournotiens
(1991) Revue économique / Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales — Vol. 42, n° 6, p. 967-996 (1991)
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- Contrary to a widespread belief, strategic choices described by the Cournotian model are not confined to quantities. Only, price strategies are constrained by the fact that << the price is necessarily the same >> for producers of a homogeneous good. This idea is modelled by introducing a pricing scheme P which associates a uniform market price with producers's announced prices. The authors then define a P-equilibrium (in quantities and prices) associated with such a scheme; this equilibrium leads to the same outcome as Cournot equilibrium, as soon as the scheme allows enough control. Business practices that may sustain some of these pricing schemes are also dicussed. The concept of P-equilibrium is then extended to the case of multiple or differentiated products, thus generalizing both Cournot and Chamberlin equilibria. The question of quantity vs. price-strategies is revisited in this context. Finally the authors show, within a spatial model of horizontal product differentiation, that the concept of P-equilibrium answers, for an appropriate choice of the scheme P, the question of existence which threats both price and quantity equilibria, as soon as differentiation is too weak.
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d’Aspremont-Lynden, C., Ferreira, RD., & Gerardvaret, LA. (1991). Concurrence en prix et équilibres cournotiens. Revue économique / Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, 42(6), 967-996. https://doi.org/10.2307/3502019 (Original work published 1991)