Provably Secure Hardware Masking in the Transition- and Glitch-Robust Probing Model: Better Safe than Sorry
(2021) IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems — Vol. 2021, n° 2, p. 136-158 (2021)
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- Abstract
- There exists many masking schemes to protect implementations of crypto-graphic operations against side-channel attacks. It is common practice to analyzethe security of these schemes in the probing model, or its variant which takes intoaccount physical effects such as glitches and transitions. Although both effects existin practice and cause leakage, masking schemes implemented in hardware are oftenonly analyzed for security against glitches. In this work, we fill this gap by provingsufficient conditions for the security of hardware masking schemes against transitions,leading to the design of new masking schemes and a proof of security for an existingmasking scheme in presence of transitions. Furthermore, we give similar results inthe stronger model where the effects of glitches and transitions are combined.
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Citations
Cassiers, G., & Standaert, F.-X. (2021). Provably Secure Hardware Masking in the Transition- and Glitch-Robust Probing Model: Better Safe than Sorry. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2021(2), 136-158. https://doi.org/10.46586/tches.v2021.i2.136-158 (Original work published 2021)