Strategic immigration policies and welfare in heterogeneous countries
(2003)
Files
dp2003-95_Fig1_.pdf
Open Access - Adobe PDF
- 87.35 KB
Details
- Authors
- Abstract
- In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries and immigrants that come from "the rest of the world". The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias toward immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game where each country makes a strategic choice of its immigration quota. We first show that our game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium and then study the welfare implications of countries' choices. It turns out that a country with a higher degree of production complementarity and a higher level of tolerance towards immigrants would allow a larger immigration quota and achieve a higher welfare level. Our results call for coordinated and harmonized immigration policies that may improve the welfare of both countries.
- Affiliations
Citations
Fujita, M., & Weber, S. (2003). Strategic immigration policies and welfare in heterogeneous countries (CORE Discussion Papers 2003/95). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/45017