Balanced Bayesian mechanisms

Cremer, Jacques;d'Aspremont-Lynden, Claude;Gérard Varet, Louis-André
(2004) Journal of Economic Theory —

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  • Cremer, JacquesUniversité Toulouse I
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  • d'Aspremont-Lynden, ClaudeUCLouvain
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  • Gérard Varet, Louis-André
    Author
Abstract
In the transferable utility case, a number of authors have identified conditions on beliefs that guarantee the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with balanced transfers. We present a new, easy to interpret, condition and we show that it is (strictly) more general than all the other conditions found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.
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Cremer, J., d’Aspremont-Lynden, C., & Gérard Varet, L.-A. (2004). Balanced Bayesian mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.07.001