Scientific Representation and Realism
(2011) Principia : revista internacional de epistemologia — Vol. 15, n° 3, p. 461-474 (3) (2011)
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- Authors
Ghins, Michel 
- Abstract
- After a brief presentation of what I take to be the representational démarche in science, I stress the fundamental role of true judgements in model construction. The success and correctness of a representation rests on the truth of judgements which attribute properties to real targeted entities, called “ontic judgements”. I then present what van Fraassen calls “the Loss of Reality objection”. After criticizing his dissolution of the objection, I offer an alternative way of answering the Loss of Reality objection by showing that the contact of our models with reality is grounded on the truth of ontic judgements. I conclude by examining the consequence of this view on the issue of scientific realism.
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Citations
Ghins, M. (2011). Scientific Representation and Realism. Principia : revista internacional de epistemologia, 15(3), 461-474 (3). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/202726 (Original work published 2011)