An efficient distance bounding RFID authentication protocol: balancing false-acceptance rate and memory requirement
(2009) Information Security. 12th International Conference, ISC 2009 — Location: Pisa, Italy (7.September.2009)
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- Abstract
- The Mafia fraud consists in an adversary transparently relaying the physical layer signal during an authentication process between a verifier and a remote legitimate prover. This attack is a major concern for certain RFID systems, especially for payment related applications. Previously proposed protocols that thwart the Mafia fraud treat relaying and non-relaying types of attacks equally: whether or not signal relaying is performed, the same probability of false-acceptance is achieved. Naturally, one would expect that non-relay type of attacks achieve a lower probability of false-acceptance. We propose a low complexity authentication protocol that achieves a probability of false-acceptance essentially equal to the best possible false-acceptance probability in the presence of Mafia frauds. This performance is achieved without degrading the performance of the protocol in the non-relay setting. As an additional feature, the verifier can make a rational decision to accept or to reject a proof of identity even if the protocol gets unexpectedly interrupted.
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Citations
Avoine, G., & Tchamkerten, A. (2009). An efficient distance bounding RFID authentication protocol: balancing false-acceptance rate and memory requirement. In Samarati, P.; Ardagna, C.A.; Yung, M.; Martinelli, F.; (ed.), Information Security. 12th International Conference, ISC 2009 (p. p. 250-261). Springer verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04474-8_21