Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity
(2002)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus-maximizing delegates or to wage-maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the strike activity is greater whenever the union chooses wage-maximizing delegates instead of surplus-maximizing delegates. We also provide the necessary and sufficient condition such that it is always optimal for the union to choose wage-maximizing delegates and we find tha the efficiency loss due to strategic delegation may be quite important.
- Affiliations
Citations
Mauleon, A., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2002). Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity (ECON Working Paper 2002/11). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/61788