Comparison of information structures

Gossner, O
(2000) Games and Economic Behavior — Vol. 30, n° 1, p. 44-63 (2000)

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  • Gossner, O
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Abstract
We introduce the notion of an information structure T as bring richer than another F when for every game G, all correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced by F are also induced by T. In particular, if T is richer than F then T can make all agents as well off as a in any game. Ws also define a to be faithfully reproducible from T when all the players can compute from their information in T "new information" that reproduces what they could have received from F. Our main result is that T is richer than F if and only if F is faithfully reproducible from T. Classification Number: C72. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
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Gossner, O. (2000). Comparison of information structures. Games and Economic Behavior, 30(1), 44-63. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0706 (Original work published 2000)