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constitutionsCTNworkshop.pdf
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The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have speci c rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modi ed any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have in uence on the stability of the job market.
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Mauleon, A., Röhl, N., & Vannetelbosch, V. (2015). Constitutions and Social Networks (NOTA DI LAVORO, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2015.059). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/188043