Although the tax system is not marriage neutral in many countries, it has been found to be only slightly significant in determining marriage decisions (Buffeteau and Echevin, 2003; Alm and Whittington, 1995). This paper tests whether the tax system can alter the decision to contract a civil union, which is less binding than a marital contract. In 1999, France introduced civil union (pacs) as an alternative legal union to marriage. I assess the impact of taxation on the decision to contract a pacs using a difference-in-differences evaluation of the 2005 income tax reform for newly pacsed couples. As the control group is contaminated by the reform, I propose an original estimation method based on a difference-in-differences-in-differences setting to estimate bounds to the impact of the reform. My results find a positive and increasing impact of taxation on pacs rates, but also a change in the timing of pacs unions suggesting that taxation alters the decision to contract a pacs. In addition, I find a slightly significant impact of taxation on the decision to terminate a pacs.
Leturcq, M. (2012). Will you civil union me ? Journal of Public Economics, 96(5-6), 541-552. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.02.008 (Original work published 2012)