Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods
(2010) Journal of Mathematical Economics — Vol. 47, n° 1, p. 29-36 (2011)
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- Abstract
- We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple theoretical model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. We show that if we allow agents to vote for any method within a rich domain of piece-wise linear methods, then a majority voting equilibrium exists. Furthermore, if most voters have income below mean income then each method within the domain can be supported in equilibrium.
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moreno ternero, j. (2010). Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 47(1), 29-36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.11.002 (Original work published 2011)