Dominance Invariant Roommate Problems
(2013) Bordeaux Economic Theory Workshop on Interactions, Institutions and Design — Location: Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, Bordeaux (France) (28.May.2013)
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- Abstract
- Solution concepts in social environments use either a direct or indirect dom- inance relationship, depending on whether it is assumed that agents are myopic or farsighted. Direct dominance implies indirect dominance, but not the reverse. Hence, the predicted outcomes when assuming myopic (direct) or farsighted (in- direct) agents could be very di¤erent. In this paper, we characterize dominance invariant roommate problems when preferences are strict. That is, we obtain the conditions on preference pro les such that indirect dominance implies direct domi- nance in roommate problems and give these an intuitive interpretation. Whenever some of the conditions are not satis ed, it is important to know the kind of agents that are being investigated in order to use the appropriate stability concept. Further- more, we characterize dominance invariant roommate problems having a non-empty core. Finally, we show that, if the core of a dominance invariant roommate prob- lem is not empty, it contains a unique matching, the dominance invariant stable matching, in which all agents who mutually top rank each other are matched to one another and all other agents remain unmatched.
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Mauleon, A., Molis Banales, E., Vannetelbosch, V., & Vergote, W. (2013). Dominance Invariant Roommate Problems. Bordeaux Economic Theory Workshop on Interactions, Institutions and Design, Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, Bordeaux (France). https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/205077