(en) Within the European Union, the Member States have generally retained the powers in the field of direct taxation and use them to attract investment, creating thus competition in the tax law market. In the past, this tax competition has in the form of positive actions by states (eg introduction of tax regimes favorable for certain categories of enterprises or activities) to which taxpayers reacted by planning their activities. We observe that this tax competition has evolved to encompass a different form, which is characterized by the (too) passive attitude of a member vis-à-vis the (aggressive) tax planning of companies. This contribution examines how this last phenomenon of passive tax competition is apprehended by European law and in particular by state aid rules that the Commission mobilized in 2013 against it. This mobilization has given rise to a number criticism that the Commission's actions imply an erroneous interpretation Article 107 (1) TFEU on the merits and in particular the requirement of selectivity which upset the vertical and horizontal structure of the EU legal order. The purpose of this article is to analyze exclusively the merits of this wave of criticism and hence evaluate the actions of the Commission from an institutional point of view.
Sabbadini, P. M., & Joris Luts. (2018). Evaluation institutionnelle des actions de la Commission en matière d’aides d’Etat contre la concurrence fiscale passive. Revue des affaires européennes, 2019. https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/sqn7z (Original work published 2018)