Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems
(2005) Economie publique — Vol. 17, n° 2, p. 125-139 (2005)
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- Authors
- Abstract
- We present new conditions that guarantee the existence of mechanism with a unique or essentially unique equilibrium in auction and public goods problems with quasi-linear utility functions. These conditions bear only on the information structures of the agents.
- Affiliations
Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse CNRS Université de la Méditerranée GREQAM
Citations
d’Aspremont-Lynden, C., Cremer, J., & Gerard Varet, L.-A. (2005). Unique implementation in auctions and in public goods problems. Economie publique, 17(2), 125-139. https://hdl.handle.net/2078.5/53214 (Original work published 2005)